modern social life. At its most basic, globalization is quite simply a description of these networks and of their implications -for instance in the various 'flows' -of capital, commodities, people, knowledge, information and ideas, crime, pollution, diseases, fashions, beliefs, images and so on -across international boundaries.
This increasing connectivity is, in some ways, an obvious aspect of our lives. It is something we can all -at least in developed societies -recognise in everyday routine practices: in our use of communications technologies -mobile phones, computers, email, the internet -in the built environment we inhabit, in the sort of food we eat, in the way we earn our livings, and in the way we entertain ourselves -in cinema, television and so on. Its pretty obvious that we are living in a much more globally 'connected' world today than even thirty of forty years ago. But what does this all mean culturally? Does it mean that , as many people suppose, we are inevitably being drawn together, for good or ill, into a single global culture ?
A Global Culture ?
One reason why people believe that globalization will lead to a single global culture is that they see the effects of connectivity in other spheres -particularly in the economic sphere -producing an integrated system .Whereas it was in the past possible to understand social and economic processes and practices as a set of local, relatively 'independent' phenomena, globalization makes the world , to quote Roland Robertson (1992) , a 'single place'. Obvious examples of this are the way in which the economic affairs of nation-states are locked into a complex global capitalist economic system which restricts the autonomy of individual states , or how the environmental effects of local industrial processes can rapidly become global problems.
However, increasing global connectivity by no means necessarily implies that the world is becoming either economically or politically 'unified'. Despite its reach, few would dare to claim that the effects of globalization currently extends in any profound way to every single person or place on the planet, and speculation on its spread must surely be tempered by the many countervailing trends towards social, political and indeed cultural division that we see around us. This is a point that is frequently made by theorists of development : what used to be called the 'Third World' does not partake of the globalised economy or of globalised communications in the same way as the developed world. So we have to qualify the idea of globalization by saying that it is an uneven process -with areas of concentration and density of flow and other areas of neglect or even perhaps exclusion (Massey, 1994) . So globalization in this sense is not quite global! Despite this , there persists , at least amongst Western critics, a tendency to think about globalization as the production of one single all encompassing 'global culture'. To understand this tendency I believe we have to see it in a long historical context of the imagination of a unified world : as a form of cultural universalism . So I am going to consider, very briefly, three examples of this sort of imagination and I will suggest that they have more in common than at first appears.
My first example comes from long before the current phase of globalizing modernity , in fact from 13 th Century Europe.
Image 1 : Ebstorf Mappa Mundi
The Ebstorf Mappa Mundi made in 1284 -and attributed to the English cartographer Here, then, we find a very early, pre-modern example of an imagined theologically revealed 'globalism' The problem with it -as is all too evident to us from our perspective in history -is the entirely spurious nature of its universal pretensions. Just as the medieval cartographer ignored -or was ignorant of -the rival claims of the non-Christian worldviews, but can be seen at the core of European Enlightenment rational modernity.
The privileging of the western cultural experience -along with its particular version of rationality and its cultural and political values -over that of the rest of the world can be seen in cosmopolitan thinkers from Kant through to Marx.
And so, moving on six hundred years, it is Karl Marx who provides my second example.
Marx presents a particularly bold picture of a global culture in his depiction of a future communist society. This is a world in which the divisions of nations have disappeared, along with all other particular, 'local' attachments, including religious beliefs; a world with a universal language, a world literature and cosmopolitan cultural tastes.
Thus in the Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels write in a way that seems to anticipate the current globalization process :
In the place of the old wants satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant 'self-sufficiency' and 'stagnation', so that they may progress towards the world historical communist revolution .
The fact is that Marx was a convinced cosmopolitan humanist -an internationalist who despised nationalism and patriotism as reactionary forces in all societies, set against the true cosmopolitan interests of the proletariat -the 'workers of the world'. But, for all his progressive views and the brilliance and percipience of his political-economy -his view of culture was firmly rooted in a European tradition which unquestioningly took its own experience as the pattern for universal experience. Indeed, it might be argued that it was this Eurocentric cast of Marx's thought which was at the root of the flaws in his historical and revolutionary thinking that led him to underestimate the enduring power of ethnic and religious attachments ( or their transformation into nationalism ) in modernity.
Marx's universalising modernism was, in a curious way, as blind to cultural alteriority as the universalising Christianity of the medieval mapmaker. Of course these fears are not without grounds. Take any index, from clothes to food to music to film and television to architecture (the list is only limited by what one wants to include as 'cultural') and there is no ignoring the fact that certain styles, brands, tastes and practices can be encountered virtually anywhere in the world. But what does this distribution of uniform cultural goods actually signify, other than the power of some capitalist firms to command wide markets for their products around the world ? Well, if we assume that the sheer global presence of these goods is in itself a sign of a convergence towards a single capitalist culture, we are probably utilising a rather impoverished concept of culture -one that reduces a 'culture' merely to its material goods. If culture, at its root, is the production and the experience of meaning through symbolization, the thesis of global cultural convergence must contain the idea that people's interaction with these goods penetrates deeply into the way in which we construct our 'cultural worlds' and make sense of our lives.
The problem with the cultural imperialism argument is that it merely assumes such a penetration : it makes a leap of inference from the simple presence of cultural goods to the attribution of deeper cultural or ideological effects. The reason why it has to be treated with scepticism is, as John Thompson says, that 'it ignores the hermeneutic appropriation which is an essential part of the circulation of symbolic forms' (Thompson 1995: 171) . Culture simply does not transfer in this unilinear way. Movement between cultural/geographical areas always involves interpretation , translation, mutation, adaptation , and 'indigenization' as the receiving culture brings its own cultural resources to bear, in dialectical fashion, upon 'cultural imports' ( Lull 2000 , Tomlinson 1991 simply lies open to the homogenizing advance of western culture is similar to earlier forms of ethnocentricism in at least one respect. This is that it generally involves a failure to appreciate the resilience of cultures in the face of external influence which is itself a failure to imagine globalization from the perspective of other cultures.
If the critical understanding of cultural globalization seems haunted by the tendency to assume either an implausibly utopian or dystopian scenario, then the lesson may be that we need to approach cultural processes not via the macro perspective of globality, but precisely the opposite way , by understanding the effects of globalization as the are felt within particular localities.
The vast majority of us live local lives. But the impact of globalization is to change the very texture of this locality and therefore the nature of cultural experience in general. No longer is culture 'tied' to the constraints of local circumstances. What this implies is not that globalization destroys localities but that cultural experience is in various ways 'lifted out' of its traditional 'anchoring' in particular localities. One way of understanding this is to think about the places we live in as being increasingly 'penetrated' by the connectivity of globalization. We continue to live in places that retain a high degree of cultural distinctiveness -London clearly has its own cultural 'feel' quite different from Beijing -but the point is that this particularity is no longer -as it may have been in the past -the most important determinant of our cultural experience.
This 'deterritorialising' aspect of globalization -felt in very ordinary everyday practices like shopping, watching television, phoning our friends, visiting a restaurant -is , I
believe the real -rather than imagined -cultural impact of globalization that we must begin both theoretically and empirically to understand.
